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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
DANIEL ALLEN TEMPLE, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 16522 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged with two felonies--Possession 
of a Stolen Motor Vehicle in violation of § 41-1-112, Utah 
Code Ann., (1953, as amended), and Theft in violation of 
§ 76-6-404, Utah Code Ann., (1953, as amended), to which he 
pleaded not guilty (R. 10). He was later charged with the 
Class A misdemeanor offense of Attempted Possession of a 
Stolen Motor Vehicle, to which appellant pleaded guilty 
(R .. 8, :.'1). 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was sentenced by Judge David B. Dee 
on May 23, 1979, in the Third Judicial District, in and 
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, to a term of 11 months, 
such term "to run consecutively with the present sentence 
and concurrently with the sentence of Judge Gowans" (R. 28), 
who had so sentenced appellant on May 2, 1979 for Failure 
to Respond to an Officer's Signal to Stop, also a Class A 
misdemeanor (R. 38 and Appellant's Brief at p. 1). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmation of the judgments and 
sentence of the lower court. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Inasmuch as this appeal is limited to a review of 
a court's consecutive sentencing power, and inasmuch as 
appellant pleaded guilty to the offense charged in the 
information, no transcript was made of the proceedings and 
thus this sketchy statement of facts is derived solely 
from the trial court's record. 
On January 28, 1979, a motor vehicle was stolen 
from the Budget Rent-A-Car parking lot. On or about Febru~ 
1, 1979, appellant was observed driving a 1979 Mercury 
automobile, serial number 9Z6<:F618790, in an unlawful manner 
-2-
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8'J'A'l'E OF ll'l't•ll 
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-vs- C a c: e ! hl • 16 S :' 2 
D. i·! LI'L lii.IYIJ 'l'IJ:l'LE 
lle fenct:m t -1\p pe llant. 
r:EPLY TU f;J(l]<F CW HESPOffllEII'L' 
'rhrour:hout the Brief of Respondent, tlw liespondent makes 
frequent reference to the 'fact' that the Appellant was charged 
with two ( 2) felony charges of thieft--wllich were both, the 
Respondent claims--later plea bargained down to a Class A Misdemeanor. 
l\ snnll, almost worthless point, your Appellant observes, but 
considering the vit~or with which tJ,is mis-statement has been applied, 
ami the many tirr.f:s the Hespondent h:J.s made reference to it leads 
your undereducat~d and bewildered Appellant into believing that 
lLe Hespondent, \'lith his greater knowledge of law, may have a legal 
l•l·:k' in his rrrout.l1, worryln£': it bec:,u~e of :;onte sound lee;al principal. 
Yout' A!~PL·llanL was char·c·-,d with 'Thi< ft uy 1\eceivinr:' by an 
c" l•i \ iuu,; Lut sl o\'i Assistant Jlistri ct Attonu·y, v1ho found later that 
•~_, ,·J,;,c,-,_~ ~'~''': tlrlSlli'POrtabl·- ·,r,J dic:tni:::;s,d il IJet'orc Prclimirr:J.ry 
tkcu·itq_:, w::ts :jclwJuled. A new charc:e, 'Posse:::>sion of a Stolen Motor 
· .• -1 1 \,'lL' \v::ts instituted on several technical grounds. This charge of 
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' (J![ ! I iV ,' 1 , I_ ~I '/ ( I , 
I' I L'il-l>ur'j"l r ,,,•d d >\'If) to the Cl ');·.:; (\ II'IL;d.·l!l>'' II:Or <•f I /\11' rnpt._·cl 
l'u:::~l'SS i<JIJ r,J' :r ;:tult'>l l"iotor Vr;)Jir~le 1 , LcJ v•lti.ClJ .vr•ur 1\t•)H . .:ll::Jnt 
;•JL.<Jd•.:d ·:1ilty ::1••! Viae\ o·.enteJ•·'<'cl to 11-r, .. n!l:::; cnn··:,;cut.ively vlit:h 
U1•~ 10-y,·:u· f,·Jnny sent••nce yo11r· P.rpL·ll-,ilt r'eceived 10 years ilf•:o, 
::tnd front wl~<·nc•: t11 is appe'al L;r;ne:;. 
'l'IJC're wa:: only one felony cllar[~P at ar•'J time--and your 
1\c:c;pondenL c·>.::Ji'•.·t':Jtes vllrcn lle propound:> 1\JC• felonies when only 
Lhe or[inal exlsted. 
'l'lic· !1e::po,,._lent. 1 s lor:lc i:; fa] terinr~ wh,·n he e<juates a felony 
comrnit.t< <I lr1 1Cii~fJ and a rnisdemc:1nor pl ea-b:1rp:ain with the two (2) 
or rr!CJJ'e f-.'loni . .::.: HlJlch are a cond·ition 0f ::.•nterrclnr~ consecutjvely 
in ::JccUon 76->401(1). The f\espondent dives i.nto subsections (2) 
ttwu (5) i1litll1y maldne; the point that the Appellant should have 
L'eon seJrtenced to many horrible years in the State Prl~on as a 
resu1t of the misdemeanor conviction--cclnpletely ignoring the 
controlling law in Section 76-3-401(1). 
It should be noted on pa~e four (4) the Respondent states 
t!Jat the l'ourt has authority t:o sentence consecutively where 
defendant has l.leen adjudc;ed gui1ty of two or more offenses. Later 
he rc'lucrJntly <<drni.ts th:lt ::Jcctlon 76-3-401(1) does state that a 
dt•fl-ncl:lnt· must have been adju·l:';ed ['~uiJ ty of rnore than one felony 
, .rrenc;.·, :HJrl then the Respondent use::; three pages of Drief to urc:e 
I i1j S t'C•ttl to ·i i"llOPC t!Je liHI, 
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Stett~ _ _v_:_~::..'-~ (5li' P.?d W(O), the Hec;pondent would have the 
Court beljpve, ~ives support to his positlon. In f3ct, the who1e 
appeal centered on the question of whether the trial court had 
considered the: e;ravlty and circumstances of the fel12rd.P~ when it 
imposed a consecutive sentence. Such are not the facts at issue. 
Appellant is a misdemeanant--convicted of a Clas~ A Misdemeanor--
and Section 76-J-liOl clearly sets l imi taUons on the sentencing 
Court's power to sentence consecutively. 
On paGe nine (9) of the Brief of Respondent, it may be noted 
that the Respondent is using legal and latin terminology which 
confuses the Appellent--but using his exact context that it is a 
fact that under the general legal and statutory principle of 
in pari materia, similar statutes must be read together for the 
acgregate, ct~ulative effect of each to be realized, your Appellant 
would submit that the reading of Section 77-35-14 and 76-3-401(1) 
1 
in pari materia (and remembering that 76-3-401 is headlined Concurrent 
or Consecutive sentences--Limitations.--) the only conclusion is that, 
the Court acted improperly in sentencing Appellant consecutively 
with the offense he was presently serving. One of the controlling 
limitations is that the defendant be convicted of more than one 
felony. This condition has not been met in the instant case, and usin 
the reasonjng propounded by the learned Respondent--construing 76-3-40 
to mean that there is some limitation on the Court's power to sentence 
consecutively--then 77-35-14 must be construed to mean that the 
Legislature knowingly circumscribed and delineated tl1e Court's power 
to impose consecutive sentences. 
-3-
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Section 77-3~-14 has been drasti~ally cJ,anged ~ince the Dodce 
decision (State v. Dodee, 19 Utah 2d 44, li~S P.2d 78l(l9fo7)) and 
the wording of the old statute, which gave the almoat unbridled 
power to sentence consecutively (in the Dod,~e case, it was argued 
that is was foolish and redundant to ~entence a man to 5 more years 
when he already had a life sentence--and ur,1~r the old statute, your 
court agreed that the sentencing court had the power to impose a 
consecutive sentence). The law has been changed, limitations 
written into the law which prevent the unjust application of the 
law. These limitations are written by the legislature in the 
Statutes--and it is plain and clear that the legislature intended 
to limit the Court's assumption of the unrestricted right to sentence 
any malefactor consecutively or concurrently. The legislature 
restricted the court to the case and category of felony convictions, 
to not more than a cumulative sentence of thirty (30) years, presumes 
that the sentenced malefactor will be considered by the Board of 
Pardons and limits the aggregate minimum to less than twelve (12) year 
The Respondent, on page ten (10) comes forth with the utterly 
invalid arcument that if the Court was to have sentenced your 
Appellant to an 11-month sentence concurrent with h1s present 10-year 
felony sentence, he would have been released on November 30, 1979. 
~1at utter rot! An 11-month sentence imposed by Judge Dee (and by 
Judge Gowan of the Sth Circuit Court) on May 22, 1979 WOI!ld have 
expirated on April 22, 1980--eleven months after its imposition. 
-4-
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Your 1\!Jpellant woulJ point out and Eubmit that he was 
arrested on February l, 1979--subsequently sentenced to ll-months 
to be served consecutively to his previously imposed Grand 
Larceny sentence of 10 years--and is due to be released from Prison 
on October 30, 1980. Your Appellant will be serving twenty months 
of Jail and State Prison time for a Class A Misdemeanor. 
Your Appellant requests that he be permitted to offer Oral 
"l'f',Urnents in the instnnt appeal. 
Your Appellant contends that his constitutional rights to a 
Fair Trial, Equal Protection of the Laws and Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment have all been abridged by the illegal imposition of 
a consecutive sentence. 
Your Appellent urges and prays this court to resentence him 
to the 11-month sentence(s) he has received--to be served concurrently 
as the law provides. 
Respectfully submitted, 
~~~ff7::~ 
.::.---- ~L ALLEN 'l'E!IJPL# ~ 
Appellant-in-Person 
Box 250 
Draper, Utah, 3q020 
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DEL T'·'ERY CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the above and foregoing Reply to Brief of Respondent to 
ROBSH'I' HANSEN, ATTORIJLY GLNERA~ 236 State Capitol Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, this /~ay of OCTOBER , 1979. 
~~~t4 
APPELLANT IN PERSOj 
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